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Abstract  In his Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong argues for 
internal conception of political liberalism which goal is to show that a libe-
ral well-ordered society is internally coherent ideal and that citizens who 
would be raised in such society could endorse and support their own liberal 
institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in 
particular way These institutions should be justified by particular concepti-
on of public reason which main feature is that overlapping consensus is the 
first stage of its justificatory structure. So, public reasoning of citizens in 
well-ordered society should be based solely on values and ideas inherent to 
liberal conception of justice – freedom, equality, fair system of cooperation 
and burdens of judgment. Another important feature of Quong’s conception 
of public reason concerns its scope. Quong argues for a wide scope of public 
reason which demands that all coercive or binding laws or public policies 
should be justified (whenever possible) on basis of these values alone. Thus, 
reasonable citizens in well-ordered society by definition accord deliberative 
priority to public reasons over their other comprehensive or nonpublic be-
liefs whenever they exercise their collective political power over one another. 
The problem I raise in this paper is that it is very likely that in well-ordered 
society there will be a group of citizens that will not accord full deliberative 
priority to political values, especially not at all levels of political deliberation. 
On certain issues they will like to see their particular values being realized 
through common political institutions. If our political theory excludes this 
group from justificatory constituency on this particular issue or categorize 
them as unreasonable it can easily undermine their general adherence to 
liberal conception of justice and endanger stability of well-ordered society. 
Thus, my point is that we need a further development of political liberalism 
to solve such problems not as a part of non-ideal theory but as a part of its 
ideal of well-ordered society. 
Keywords:  Quong, Rawls, political liberalism, public reason, reasonablene-
ss, sincerity, moral duty of civility
It is a great privilege to have the opportunity to discuss Jonathan Quong’s 
Liberalism without Perfection. This book is one of finest accounts of po-
litical liberalism that will surely have wide impact on new generation of 
political thinkers interested in liberal political theory. Perfectionist lib-
erals have good target to attack and political liberals have a great start-
ing point for further development of their theory. I agree with Quong’s 
account of political liberalism, so the aim of this paper is not to raise Is theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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critical points about his book. Rather, aim is to provoke Quong to elab-
orate more on certain problems concerning stability of well-ordered so-
ciety that can possibly go beyond his initial account.
Starting point in Quong’s thinking of political liberalism is to develop 
an internal conception of political liberalism the goal of which is “to 
show that a kind of citizens who would be raised in a society well-or-
dered by a liberal conception of justice could endorse and support their 
own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and princi-
ples are justified in particular way”.1 The main feature of Quong’s inter-
nal conception of political liberalism is that the constituency of pub-
lic justification is made only of reasonable citizens that, by definition, 
accept political values and always accord them deliberative priority in 
reasoning about political rules that their common political institutions 
should implement.2 These political values – fairness, equality, freedom 
and reasonable pluralism (characterized by burdens of judgment) – 
are in the focus of overlapping consensus. Thus, overlapping consen-
sus is conceptualized as the first stage in the justificatory structure of a 
political liberalism.3 We begin by asking what values or ideals citizens 
in an ideally well-ordered liberal society would all accept, and then we 
use those ideas as the basis for subsequent philosophical argument and 
public reasoning about the content of liberal justice. So, political rea-
soning according to this picture is post – overlapping consensus reason-
ing (post-OC reasoning). 
Further aspect of post-OC reasoning is that we have two kinds of disa-
greement – foundational reasonable disagreement (FRD) and justifica-
tory reasonable disagreement (JRD).4 Former kind of disagreement is 
characterized by the fact that there are no shared premises or frame-
works between the parties, latter kind of disagreement is characterized 
by the fact that the parties share certain premises which frame their 
dispute. First kind of disagreement is part of pre-OC reasoning, while 
the latter is part of post- OC reasoning. So, there is a principled reason 
for treating these two kinds of disagreements differently. Quong’s main 
point is that there is asymmetry between these two kinds of disagree-
ment. FRD is disagreement about the good, and JRD is disagreement 
about justice. Even in well-ordered society it would be implausible to 
1   Quong (2011), p. 158
2   Ibid, ch. 5
3   Ibid, ch. 6
4   Ibid, ch. 7lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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think that all reasonable citizens would give equal weight to same pub-
lic reasons and hold same particular law justified by these same reasons. 
Citizens will differently weigh public reasons and they will disagree on 
outcomes of their post-OC reasoning. But, the important thing is that 
whatever decision is reached we can expect that all citizens can reason-
ably accept it, because it is based on shared political values, even if they 
think that some other decision is more reasonable or more just.5 Thus, 
the criterion by which the law is just and legitimate is that it can be rea-
sonably accepted and not that it cannot be reasonably rejected. 
The criterion of reasonable acceptance and not reasonable rejection is 
in accordance with Rawls’ principle of liberal legitimacy which states 
that “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is ex-
ercised in accordance with constitution the essentials of which all citi-
zens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason”.6 In 
this way we can see the link between justice and legitimacy. If liberal 
theory of justice is based on political values that all citizens accept in 
JRD and if they base their reasoning solely on these values then, even if 
they reasonably disagree on which outcome is best, whatever decision 
is reached will be reasonably just and legitimate.7 Thus, our exercise of 
political power over each other can be legitimate only if it is within the 
range of liberal theory of justice, and we know that it is within this range 
only if it is based on political values all reasonable citizens share. Soci-
ety for which internal conception of political liberalism is designed is 
well-ordered liberal society and that is the reason we start from liberal 
theory of justice. 
Essential idea of political liberalism which refers to practice of political 
justification is idea of public reason. Since idea of public reason refers 
to question of legitimate exercise of our political power over each other 
then it is evident that for Quong the idea of public reason is grounded 
in the value of justice.8 
This, I believe, can also be said for the moral duty of civility which refers 
to moral demands that norms of public reason place on citizens and of-
ficials in their political behavior or, in other words, in their exercising 
5   Ibid, p. 209–210
6   Rawls (1996), p. 137 (my italics)
7   On difference between reasonably just and perfectly just institutions see Quong 
(2011), p. 133.
8   On different ways of grounding the idea of public reason see Quong (2013).Is theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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their political power over each other in well-ordered society. Moral duty 
of civility, similarly as liberal principle of legitimacy, requires from citi-
zens to “to be able to explain to one another on this fundamental ques-
tion how the principles and policies they advocate can be supported by 
the political values of public reason”.9 Moral duty of civility asks from 
citizens to reason with each other only in terms of public reasons or 
political values, at least when fundamental questions of justice are at 
stake. As we will see below, Quong does not restrict public reason only 
to fundamental questions of justice, but for now we can leave this prob-
lem aside. So, we have a moral, not legal, duty to restrain our reasoning 
on political issues on post- OC reasoning. Where that duty does comes 
from? I believe that it is possible to ground that duty in more fundamen-
tal duty – natural duty of justice 10. Natural duty of justice “requires us 
to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. 
It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at 
least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves”.11 How 
do citizens in well-ordered society fulfill their duty of justice? Since rea-
sonable pluralism is an internal fact about well-ordered society it would 
be wrong to determine one true or perfect conception of justice backed 
by comprehensive reasons and then demand from all citizens to com-
ply with it. Disputes about comprehensive doctrines are part of foun-
dational reasonable disagreement and any such proposal can be rea-
sonably rejected. Demands of justice are not demands to accept certain 
comprehensive doctrine. Alternative approach is to define core politi-
cal values of very broad liberal theory of justice – freedom, equality, 
fairness, cooperation and reasonable pluralism. Thus, if political deci-
sions are reached solely on these values they will be reasonably just and 
therefore legitimate. When we as citizens exercise our political power 
over each other we should rely solely on political values (moral duty of 
civility) because this is the way how we support just institutions (natu-
ral duty of justice) in well-ordered society characterized by reasonable 
pluralism. Also, if we respect moral duty of civility we can demand com-
pliance from other citizens on the basis of natural duty of justice even 
though there will be reasonable disagreement about political outcomes. 
Further aspect of public reason and moral duty of civility is sincerity re-
quirement. As Quong says – “We cannot, in other words, merely aim at 
9   Rawls (1996), p. 217
10   Quong grounds principle of liberal legitimacy in the natural duty of justice. See 
Quong(2011), p. 131–135
11   Rawls (1971), p. 99lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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getting others to assent to our proposals, we must sincerely believe our 
proposal can be justified to them”.12 When we offer political proposals 
or reasons for these proposals to others “we should sincerely think that 
our view of the matter is based on political values that everyone can be 
reasonably expected to endorse”.13 The reason for sincerity requirement 
is nicely stated by Quong:
“If we acted insincerely toward other citizens, if we offered arguments 
we believed to be invalid, or which we believed others had no good rea-
son to accept, we would fail to respect their status as citizens who can 
understand and respond to moral reasons, and are owed justifications 
for the rules that regulate social cooperation”.14
Quong formulates sincerity requirement as a principle of justificatory 
sincerity (PJS). If we suppose we have political constituency of only two 
persons, A and B, and they face a choice as to whether or not to endorse 
proposal X, PJS “requires that A may only endorse X if the following are 
true (and vice versa for B):
1)  A reasonably believes he is justified in endorsing X.
2)  A reasonably believes that B is justified in endorsing X.
Furthermore, following Rawls’s duty of civility,
3)  A may only (in the political domain) offer arguments in favor 
of X to B that he reasonably believes B would be justified in 
accepting”.15
It is clear that respecting PJS requires that our justification must be based 
on shared reasons. These shared reasons as we already mentioned are 
grounded in core political values of liberal theory of justice, so we can 
once again find basis of public reason in value of justice. But, as Quong 
notices, sincerity requirement has also further role – “it distinguishes 
public reason from rhetoric and manipulation”.16 This role is very impor-
tant in sustaining the value of civic friendship and respect.17 It means 
that by manifesting our adherence to public reason in our political 
12   Quong (2011), p. 265
13   Rawls, (1996), p. 241
14   Quong (2011), p. 266
15   Ibidem
16   Quong (2011), p. 265
17   IbidemIs theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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behavior we constitute a valuable kind of relationship with our fellow 
citizens. I believe that this kind of relationship is necessary for a just so-
ciety to be stable over time. Thus, it is not only that idea of public reason 
plays important role to sustain justice in well-ordered society, but also it 
plays important role to sustain stability in such society in terms of rela-
tion between citizens. Problem of stability will, I believe, confront inter-
nal conception of political liberalism with need for widening its scope 
from post-OC reasoning to consider some issues of   pre-OC reasoning. 
To see this problem let us start with imagining a political community 
we can name Political Liberal Expert State (PLES) with deliberative leg-
islative body such as parliament constituted by representatives and ju-
dicial body as Supreme Court constituted by experts. Further, let’s im-
agine that in parliament there are no constraints on reasons officials can 
appeal to when they deliberate with each other on certain laws or pub-
lic policies. They simply propose a certain law and offer perfectionist or 
comprehensive reasons of the group they represent. Of course, they de-
liberate with each other about these reasons arguing for or against cer-
tain comprehensive beliefs, they listen to each other, they respect each 
other and they are willing to meet each other halfway by making com-
promises on certain laws. After certain time given for deliberation they 
vote for proposed laws and law chosen by majority is passed on this level 
of legislation. But, this level is not enough for law to be enacted. There is 
also a second level that every elected law must pass – level of very active 
Supreme Court that questions if this particular law can be justified by 
public reason irrespectively of its prior justification it has got in parlia-
ment. In this body, Justices check if the law is in line with political val-
ues of freedom, equality and fairness and if it can be justified solely on 
reasons that reasonable citizens can accept. If the law does not pass the 
test of public reason then the issue it was supposed to regulate is again 
discussed in parliament. There is another round of discussion and an-
other voting procedure and again elected law comes in front of the Jus-
tices. On the other hand, if the law is not in contrast to liberal political 
values, if it can be justified by public reasons alone then Justices will 
provide such justification and enact the law. Will this law be just and 
legitimate? Well, there is no reason why it should not be. First, the con-
tent and rationale for the law is in line with liberal theory of justice. Sec-
ond, concerning legitimacy, Quong advocates duty-based conception of 
legitimate authority: “One way to establish that a person has legitimate 
authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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is likely better to fulfill the duties of justice he is under if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to 
follow them, rather than by trying to directly fulfill the duties he is un-
der himself” 18. So, by respecting the authority of our imagined Supreme 
Court it is likely to be the best way to achieve what justice requires. 
Will this law be publicly justified? I suppose it will if we stipulate that 
in such society there are only reasonable citizens who by definition as-
cribe deliberative priority to political values and public reason. Thus, 
even though citizens and public officials offer each other their compre-
hensive reasons for certain law because they ascribe priority to political 
values, they accept when the law for which they voted is turned down by 
Supreme Court even if they were in majority. On the other hand, minor-
ity can also accept the law they voted against because finally it is justi-
fied in terms of public reasons and by definition it is part of justificatory 
reasonable disagreement, so they can reasonably accept such justifica-
tion for the law. So, the law finally is justified by the shared perspective 
(given by Supreme Court) even though on the first step officials pre-
sented the case for the law in terms of their comprehensive or perfec-
tionist perspective. After the law is enacted everybody knows that oth-
ers accept the law and consider it justified either because they ascribe 
priority to shared perspective and political values (minority group) or 
because they consider it justified within their own comprehensive doc-
trine (majority group).
So, in a sense, ascribing deliberative priority to political values can be 
seen as delegating to others – experts like Justices in the example above 
– job of finding public reasons for certain rule and accepting the rule be-
cause shared perspective was found and legally explicated. The rule is 
just, legitimate and enacted by procedure all reasonable citizens accept. 
Also, important aspect of this example is that every group has equal 
chance to be heard and to try to realize their values through common in-
stitutions, even though these values will be translated to public reasons. 
We can say that no one is exposed to injustice in their political interac-
tion, they are all treated justly because they are treated in terms they all 
find acceptable – everyone can pursue their own values and finally the 
law and rationale for the law will be in terms they can reasonably accept. 
But, there are certainly lots of things that are undesirable in our imag-
ined arrangement. Of course, many undesirable things are connected 
18   Quong (2011), p. 128Is theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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with disputes about value of democracy, but I will only mention prob-
lems from the point of idea of public reason.19 I will mention three prob-
lems concerning the point of public reason, scope of public reason, and 
idealization of reasonable citizens. First, as said above, public reason is 
not only about justice and justification of political rules. It is also about 
our political behavior in the role of public officials or citizens. It is about 
our exercising political power over each other and not only about our 
accepting political power that is exercised by some expert body. There 
is something valuable in relationship in which citizens themselves of-
fer each other reasons they sincerely believe others can accept, and not 
simply abiding by the rules that are reasonably justified by some agency 
outside of their political cooperation. This is linked to the question of 
stability. One important point of the idea of public reason is that it aims 
at establishing inherent stability in plural democratic society. Inherent 
stability means that there are forces within the system that can correct 
deviations from justice in contrast to imposed stability that always im-
poses some agency out of cooperation that will correct deviations.20 For 
inherent stability it is not enough that overlapping consensus obtains 
and that citizens endorse political values within their conceptions of 
good but also that in their practice this fact is manifested and made 
transparent. So, public reason can be grounded in justice in the sense of 
relation of democratic governance to the citizens, but also its moral ba-
sis is relation between citizens themselves. It is not only important that 
laws are justified to each of us, it is also important that citizens propose 
to each other fair terms on which these laws should be justified. When 
citizens in their political practice give priority to post-OC reasoning it 
ensures stability that can not be generated by experts. Rawls was clear 
on this problem:
„It is important for the viability of a just democratic regime over time for 
politically active citizens to understand those ideas. For in the long run, 
the leading interpretations of constitutional essentials are settled po-
litically. A persistent majority, or an enduring alliance of strong enough 
interests, can make of Constitution what it wants”.21
19   For example, one problem is that it can give wrong picture about democratic 
politics. As Gaus notes:“To allow that principled deliberation is in some way the spe-
cial purview of the judiciary is to accept, and encourage, the corrupted understand-
ing of politics as a battle among interest groups, each claiming to impose its favored 
policies on the rest with no better justification than it has marshaled the numbers to 
do so.“ Gaus(1996), p. 280
20   On this difference see Weithman (2010).
21   Rawls (1999), p. 496lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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It is citizens that have the responsibility to maintain a stable and just 
regime over time, and to do this they must have certain virtues for po-
litical cooperation. This surely gives republican flavor to liberalism but 
Rawls himself was aware of this:
„Classical republicanism, on the other hand, is the view that the safety 
of democratic liberties, including the liberties of nonpolitical life (the 
liberties of the moderns), requires the active participation of citizens 
who have the political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime. 
The idea is that unless there is widespread participation in democratic 
politics by vigorous and informed citizen body moved in good part by 
a concern for political justice and public good, even the best-designed 
political institutions will eventually fall into the hands of those who 
hunger for power and military glory, or pursue narrow class interests, 
to the exclusion of almost everything else. If we are to remain free and 
equal citizens, we cannot afford a general retreat into private life”.22
This requirement of citizens participating in political life on terms of 
public reason becomes more important if we defend broad view of pub-
lic reason as Quong does. This is part of the second major problem with 
PLES concerning the idea of public reason.
Second problem with PLES is that it supposes that Justices have certain 
ex ante list of public reasons and then apply it in checking if the pro-
posed law can be justified by them. Also, we would need to have a list 
of political issues that are amenable to public reason – should all laws 
that can be interpreted as coercive be sent to Justices or some of them 
should be solved solely by majority voting? How do we know which laws 
should be supported simply by majority voting in the parliament or by 
referendum and which should be send to Justices? One proposal is that 
we can make a list of laws that concern only constitutional essentials 
and matters of basic justice and only these laws should be the subject of 
public reason. Quong rejects such view of public reason and argues for 
a broad view of public reason according to which public reason should 
include all decisions where citizens exercise collective power over one 
another – all coercive or binding laws or public policies, and not only 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.23 So, in principle, 
whenever possible, we should justify our exercise of political power over 
each other in terms of public reasons. As Quong writes: „My main point 
22   Rawls (2001), p. 144
23   Quong (2011), p. 273–287.Is theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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is this: whether or not these reasons do exist, and if they do, how much 
weight they should carry in our political deliberations, can only be de-
termined ex post. In other words...we should try and adhere to the idea 
of public reason when debating non-essential political issues to see if 
they are resolvable on publicly acceptable grounds. If they are, then we 
can ground a larger number of our political decisions in substantive rea-
sons that are suitably public”.24 As I understand him on this point he 
says two things. First, which issues can be solved by public reasons can-
not be known in advance, but rather only if citizens deliberate together 
about these issues and try to find public reasons that can support politi-
cal decision. Second point is also important, it is not only that through 
deliberation we can see which issues are appropriate subject of pub-
lic reason, but also through deliberation we can see which reasons are 
suitably public, which refers to the content of public reason. Quong 
writes that „we should be open to the idea that the detailed content of 
public reason can only be worked out as part of the process of public 
reasoning”.25 In Quong’s political liberalism there is no prior list of is-
sues that are subject of public reason and prior list of reasons that are 
content of public reason like in PLES.
Third problem I want to mention about PLES is that it has an overly ide-
alized picture of citizens. According to this picture citizens offer each 
other their comprehensive views about desired rules and than simply 
accept rules justified by public reasons given by experts because we sim-
ply stipulate that they ascribe priority to public reason. Problem is that 
PLES only has idea of laws as they should be, but it does not take people 
as they are. It only presents an answer (albeit not good one) to the ques-
tion how just society is possible in circumstances of reasonable plural-
ism, but is does not answer to the question how just and stable society 
is possible in these circumstances? Namely, stability in political liberal-
ism depends on moral development of sense of justice of citizens grow-
ing in just society. It is unlikely that our Supreme Court will have such 
profound and pervasive educative role. Simply, saying that citizens will 
be the kind of persons that ascribe such priority to public reason even 
though they try to win for their own particular values is illusory. It is 
more likely that such situation will give rise to group polarization. As 
Cass Sunstein notes “In brief, group polarization means that members 
of a deliberating group predictably move to a more extreme point in 
24   Ibid, p. 285
25   Ibid, p. 289lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies”.26 
When citizens enter public forum without any constraints of public rea-
son it is more likely that they will deliberate within small groups of like-
minded people that will make their views more extreme moving them 
further from other citizens and weakening their adherence to public 
justification. Thus, we can say that picture of citizens in PLES is overly 
idealized even for well-ordered society. 
But, this problem of idealization of justificatory constituency also pre-
sents problem for stability in Quong’s idea of public reason and polit-
ical liberalism. By Quong’s definition reasonable persons are persons 
who ascribe full deliberative priority to public reason when discussing 
all political issues. So, reasonable citizens, according to Quong, are rea-
soning like experts in PLES on every political issue. In process of politi-
cal justification reasonable citizens ascribe priority to post-OC reason-
ing. It would be unfair to say that Quong’s society is utopian because 
he is aware that in well-ordered society there will also be unreasonable 
citizens. In well-ordered society political power is coercive power that 
must sometimes be used to contain threats to justice. It is then clear 
that institutions of well-ordered society will not generate its own sup-
port on behalf of all citizens living under them. There will always be 
citizens who want to see values of their comprehensive doctrine be real-
ized on state level excluding interests of those citizens that do not share 
their comprehensive view. But, if this is true than there will always in 
well-ordered society be a number of citizens that generally do adhere to 
liberal institutions and political values of public reason but on certain 
political issues they want to see their values or good be realized through 
common institutions. Thus, they do not ascribe full deliberative prior-
ity of public reason, especially not on all levels of political deliberation, 
and they also do not definitely reject deliberative priority of public rea-
son. They are not reasonable citizens according to Quong’s definition, 
but they are also not unreasonable citizens. So, maybe Quong’s group-
ing of citizens as reasonable and unreasonable does not exhaust all citi-
zens living in well-ordered society. 
We can say that problem is that Quong takes as constituency of public 
justification persons who are reasonable in a vey idealized way. The ide-
alization here is that they always accord deliberative priority to public 
reasons over other values in their comprehensive conceptions of good 
26   Sunstein (2001), p. 15Is theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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at all levels of political deliberation. They always reason like experts in 
PLES. Political domain of well-ordered society according to this idea 
is always characterized by post-OC reasoning. But, such definition of 
reasonable persons, because of this feature, is too idealized; it does not 
take into account number of citizens who surely will populate well-or-
dered society.
It seems that Rawls himself was aware of problem of overly idealizing 
reasonable citizens. According to Rawls reasonable citizens are citizens 
whose conception of good or value system are most of the time „either 
congruent with or supportive of, or else not in conflict with, the val-
ues appropriate to the special domain of the political as specified by 
a political conception of justice for a democratic regime”.27 They „nor-
mally outweigh whatever values are likely to conflict with them. “ But, 
also these persons are deeply committed to some of their comprehen-
sive values and in certain cases they want to see them realized through 
public rules and shared institutions. So, when these particular values 
come into a conflict we have a disagreement, but I would still name it 
disagreement among reasonable persons because it is among persons 
whose value systems as whole are mostly reasonable. In this particular 
case they do not pursue shared ends with others, and this conflict can 
easily come to impasse endangering their future political cooperation 
and stability of well – ordered society.
So, the problem Quong avoids, but that will likely occur in well-ordered 
society is that foundational reasonable disagreement can easily become 
value conflict which can end with a situation of impasse. In such situa-
tions it would be wrong to say simply that such persons are unreason-
able because this can move them further away from accepting priority 
of public reason even in situations where they would otherwise give pri-
ority to public reason. Now, it seems likely that two situations can   occur 
– they can make deliberative enclaves with likely effect of group polari-
zation which can turn them into unreasonable citizens or they can be-
come resident aliens feeling alienated or ambivalent to liberal values or 
shared institutions without striving to impose their values on others. 
It seems that between ideally reasonable citizens and unreasonable cit-
izens there will always be a large group of non-ideally reasonable citi-
zens. And an important question for political liberalism then becomes 
how is it possible for non-ideally reasonable citizens “to be wholehearted 
27   Rawls (1996), p. 169lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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members of a democratic society when they endorse an institutional 
structure satisfying liberal conception of justice with its own intrinsic 
political ideals and values, and when they are not simply going along 
with it in view of the balance of political and social forces?”28 
This problem of wholeheartedness becomes more serious if we have in 
mind broad view of public reason. For narrow view this problem is not 
so severe because they do not ask so much from citizens. Narrow view 
only demands from citizens to ascribe full deliberative priority to public 
reason only when they deliberate on issues concerning constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice. It can also demand full delibera-
tive priority when they discuss democratic procedures through which 
other political issues will be resolved. But, when these essentials and 
procedures are settled then they can express their values and try to win 
the day respecting constitutional and procedural constraints when oth-
er political issues are on the table. But, for the broad view of public rea-
son which demands that norms of public reason be applied to all levels 
of deliberation where citizens exercise their political power over each 
other problem of wholeheartedness can not be so easily avoided. Par-
ticularly, if we want well-ordered society to implement some democrat-
ic innovations that are open to wider citizen participation in democratic 
decision-making like, for example, participative city budgeting.29
 I believe that it is plausible to imagine that in broad view of public rea-
son that includes some institutions for wider citizen participation in 
political deliberation there will be more situations where non-ideally 
reasonable persons will try to see their values realized through common 
institutions. Can we then simply say as Quong does that although as 
citizens we should try to reason with those citizens and persuade them 
that they should give priority to public reasons but that political liberal-
ism qua political philosophy need not and should not aspire to resolve 
such situations?30 Can we say that political liberalism simply passes the 
buck to non-ideal citizens how to translate their reasons into public 
28   Rawls (1996), p. xxxviii. In this quotation Rawls explicitly mentions citizens of 
faith, but I put notion of non-ideally reasonable persons to cover wider range of 
conceptions of good like, for example, ecocentric. 
29  In participative city budgeting, citizens are through popular assemblies at a 
neighborhood and district level participating in decisions about the distribution of 
significant portions of the city’s budget. For more on this see Smith (2009). Here I 
mention participative city budgeting because example given by Quong for broad 
view of public reason – decision whether we should build an art gallery or football 
stadium (p. 280) – is an issue suitable for such democratic procedure. 
30   Quong (2011), p. 189Is theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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reasons and than deliberate together on terms of these reasons alone? 
Well, if political liberalism is concerned with stability and not only with 
justice, it seems to me that problem of wholeheartedness is a problem of 
political liberalism qua political theory. Problems of non-ideal citizens 
retreating to private life and becoming resident aliens or worse making 
deliberative enclaves that can polarize citizens to become unreasonable 
citizens are problems of political liberalism qua political theory. 
It seems to me that political liberalism must have a certain account of 
pre- overlapping consensus reasoning and not only account of post – 
overlapping consensus reasoning. The problem of pre-OC reasoning is 
how are we to reason with non-ideally reasonable persons in order for 
them to become participants of post-OC reasoning. It is important to 
note two things. First, pre-OC reasoning is not comprehensive reason-
ing. We do not reason with others in order to question the truth of their 
comprehensive doctrine, this should not be part of political theory. Sec-
ond, aim of pre-OC reasoning is not to check if certain law can be justi-
fied on basis of comprehensive reasons citizens hold. Here I agree with 
Quong that justification of laws or policies must be public in a sense 
that it is based on shared public reasons. The point is not that we reason 
with others to achieve that certain outcome (law or policy) is justified 
according to their pre-OC reasons, but to reason with others to achieve 
that they accept reasons that are suitably public for outcomes to be jus-
tified. As is already said, we do not demand that citizens accept whole-
heartedly outcomes, but only deliberative process and public reasons by 
which this outcome is justified. I believe that this is also clear in Rawls’s 
own example of pre-OC reasoning, reasoning from conjecture:
“We argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic 
doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what 
they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political concep-
tion that can provide basis for public reasons. The ideal of public rea-
son is thereby strengthened. However, it is important that conjecture 
be sincere and not manipulative. We must openly explain our inten-
tions and state that we do not assert the premises from which we argue, 
but that we proceed as we do to clear up what we take to be a misunder-
standing on other’s part, and perhaps equally on ours.”31 
Thus, as I understand him, Rawls is not saying that in reasoning from 
conjecture we try to show others that particular outcome is justified in 
31   Rawls (1999), p. 594lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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terms of their particular reasons but that they can still endorse political 
conception that can provide basis for public reasons and then to enter 
post-OC reasoning based on these reasons alone. Otherwise, we would 
behave like experts in PLES, providing justification for a law from per-
spective of political values, but then explaining others how this law can 
be justified to them on terms of their particular reasons. But, we already 
saw that this is not idea of public reason we want to have in well-or-
dered society. 
Thus, to have justice and justification we need moral duty of civility 
with PJS in political justificatory domain where laws are finally being 
justified. Justification of laws is domain of post-OC reasoning. But, hav-
ing in mind broad view of public reason and wider citizen’s political 
participation we also need political deliberative domain where non- ide-
ally reasonable citizens will sometimes offer each other their compre-
hensive reasons. This will be the domain where pre-OC reasoning will 
most likely occur. But, if moral duty of civility and PJS are only notions 
of civility and sincerity that political liberalism qua political theory em-
ploys then it will not have its own resources how to deal with such situ-
ations because they are, by definition, elements of post-OC reasoning. 
It is important to have notions of civility and sincerity on pre-OC level 
also because we want to avoid manipulation, strategic reasoning and 
bargaining – these things can endanger stability even if final outcome 
will be suitably justified. 
Appropriate notion of sincerity at a level of pre-OC reasoning is nice-
ly captured in Principle of Sincerity proposed by Gaus. According to 
Gaus’s principle of sincerity, “If we have two persons, A and B, and dif-
ferent reasons Ra and Rb, A can sincerely appeal to Rb (and vice versa) 
only if A believes that (i) B would have sufficient reason to endorse Rb 
and (ii) A could see this as intelligible and relevant, though he does not 
endorse it”.32
Let’s see Gaus’s own example of this principle:
“I believe that virtue theory is an erroneous account of basis of social 
morality, and I believe that at some level of deliberation this can be 
shown. Yet I believe that my colleagues who are virtue theorists have 
considerable warrant for their beliefs. Now suppose that I am deliber-
ating with one of these colleagues about the proper rule governing, say, 
32   Gaus (2011), p. 289Is theRe a NeeD FOR POlItIcal lIbeRalIsm tO have aN accOUNt NEBOjšA ZELIć
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property, and I point out that, on grounds of her virtue theory, rule x is 
to be ranked as superior to rule y. I believe that she has sufficient war-
rant for her beliefs at this level of deliberation, and so for her endorse-
ment of x (over y). I have respected her moral autonomy and have ap-
preciated that on these difficult matters highly competent reasoners 
have conflicting beliefs. No insincerity, manipulation, or deception is 
involved in our relations: I treat her as a free and equal person with her 
own store of warranted beliefs at this level of deliberation, which quite 
properly guide her as a rational agent.”33
Now, as already said, I do not agree with Gaus that we should justify par-
ticular rules or laws on reasons we hold unjustified.34 But, if instead of 
rules we put public reasons then I think this Principle of sincerity can be 
appropriate as part of political liberalism for pre-OC reasoning. For ex-
ample, in debate about gay marriages there are many reasons that anti-
gay marriage group can offer. Reasons that heterosexual marriage is part 
of tradition, that it has intrinsic spiritual value and reasons concerning 
interests of children. So, if we can show to this group that according to 
their comprehensive doctrine, that we do not hold justified, they should 
rank reason concerning interests of children over other reasons, I think 
that we should do it without behaving insincerely, even if we clearly vio-
late PJS. Interest of children is public reason, it should have deliberative 
priority over tradition and spirituality, and it is appropriate reason for 
justificatory domain irrespectively of the outcome itself. 
This kind of sincerity is essential part of our virtue of civility like PJS 
is essential part of our moral duty of civility. Virtue of civility I have in 
mind is one of political virtues that are „specified as those qualities of 
citizens’ moral character important in securing a just basic structure 
over time“.35 Virtue of civility directs us how to approach non - ideally 
reasonable persons when they see the threat to realization of their very 
important values through public rules in certain situations. Saying that 
this is their problem with which our theory is not concerned but unfor-
tunately they are not part of justificatory constituency on this issue can 
make them feel exposed to injustice which can endanger stability of just 
33   Gaus (2011), p. 291. Elvio Baccarini offers an attempt to reformulate the con-
vergence view in order to show that sincerity can be respected even by justification 
related to convergence. Baccarini (2014).
34   It may be useful, here, to mention the importance in Gaus’s theory of balancing 
the reasons that one has with the reasons that others have, in order to establish com-
mon moral demands with them. Cfr. Baccarini (2013).
35   Rawls (2001), p. 142lIbeRalIsm WIthOUt PeRFectION
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basic structure. We act in accordance with our virtue of civility when we 
listen to others and try to see things from the point of view of their con-
ception of good. In this way we do not only treat others in a tolerant and 
respectful way, but we communicate in a tolerant and respectful way.36 
The place where this communication occurs is part of pre-OC reasoning 
and its aim is to manifest readiness on our part and insurance on part 
of others that in justification of particular political decision everyone 
will respect moral duty of civility as essential part of post-OC reason-
ing. Finally, developing certain account of pre-OC reasoning that is part 
of political liberalism can possibly be a first step for political liberals to 
give directions how our actual societies can move more closely toward 
the ideal of well-ordered society. In actual circumstances we are very far 
from fulfilling moral duty of civility and principle of justificatory sincer-
ity, but I believe we can still cooperate together manifesting virtue of ci-
vility with its own notion of sincerity. 
Thus, I can summarize my point in this paper by one question to Quong 
– can political liberalism still be a coherent account of just and stable 
society if it does not try to develop a certain account of pre-OC reason-
ing as part of political theory? 
Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.
Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.
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Nebojša Zelić
Da li je političkom liberalizmu potreban neki model rasuđivanja 
pre preklapajućeg konsenzusa? 
apstrakt
U svojoj knjizi Liberalism without Perfection, Džonatan Kvong zastupa unu-
trašnju koncepciju političkog liberalizma, čija je namera da pokaže da je li-
beralno dobro uređeno društvo unutrašnji koherentan ideal i da će građani 
odgojeni u takvom društvu moći prihvatiti i podupreti svoje liberalne insti-
tucije i načela ukoliko su te institucije i načela odgovarajuće opravdani. Od-
govarajuće opravdanje podrazumeva posebnu koncepciju javnog uma, čija 
je glavna osobina to da je preklapajući konsenzus prvi stupanj opravdava-
lačke strukture. Dakle, javno rasuđivanje građana u dobro uređenom druš-
tvu treba se temeljiti samo na vrednostima i idejama inherentnim liberalnoj 
koncepciji pravednosti – sloboda, jednakost, pravedan sistem kooperacije i 
tereti suđenja. Druga važna osobina Kvongove koncepcije javnog uma odno-
si se na njegov doseg. Kvong brani široki doseg javnog uma što znači da bi 
svi obavezujući zakoni i javne politike treba da budu (kad god je to moguće) 
opravdani samo na temelju spomenutih vrednosti. Dakle, razložni građani 
u dobro uređenom društvu po definiciji pridaju deliberativni prioritet jav-
nim razlozima nad njihovim drugim sveobuhvatnim verovanjima kad god 
koriste svoju kolektivnu političku moć jedni nad drugima. Problem koji po-
stavljam u članku jeste da je vrlo verojatno da će u dobro uređenom društvu 
postojati grupa građana koja neće pridati potpuno deliberativno prvenstvo 
političkim vrednostima, a posebno to neće činiti na svim nivoima političke 
deliberacije. Oko nekih pitanje sigurno će hteti da vide svoje partikularne 
vrednosti realizovane kroz zajedničke političke institucije. Ukoliko naša po-
litička teorija isključuje tu grupu iz opravdanja oko nekog pojedinog proble-
ma ili ih određuje kao nerazložne, tada je verojatno da će se narušiti njihova 
opšta odanost liberalnoj koncepciji pravednosti i ugroziti stabilnost dobro 
uređenog društva. Dakle, ono što želim da istaknem jeste da nam treba dalje 
razvijanje političkog liberalizma, kako bi mogao da se suoči sa pomenutim 
problemima, ne kao deo ne-idealne teorije, već kao deo liberalnog idela do-
bro uređenog društva. 
Ključne reči:  Quong, Rawls, politički liberalizam, javni um, razložnost, 
iskrenost, moralna dužnost građanstva.